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NOTES
Investment Possibilities in the Central
American Common Market
I. INTRODUCTION
E CONOMIC INTEGRATION has created new opportunities for in-
vestment in Central America,' making the Central American
region more attractive to foreign capital.2 Although there are many
reasons why companies invest abroad, the more significant ones are
the following: a higher rate of return on investment than in the do-
mestic market; protection of the company's world market position;
access to cheaper labor; tax and tariff concessions; and nearness to
raw materials.3  Economic integration makes the investment climate
more desirable for several reasons. It adds regional planning to
the area, which results in the more efficient allocation of resources,
the spurring of trade, and the general promotion or development of
the economy. Further, it provides access to the entire region.
Economic integration has also created opportunities for the coun-
tries in which the investment is made.4 Usually, the local govern-
ment or local forces of capital formation lack the capital, expertise
in management, and technology to industrialize. Foreign invest-
ment may provide all three in varying degrees. Capital from the
outside helps the local government's balance of payments as does
the export of the final product. Industrialization creates jobs which
lead to a trained labor force in the country, and also develops the
country's infrastructure through an improved communication and
1 The members of the Central American Common Market are Guatemala, El Sal-
vador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. With over 14 million people and
170,000 square miles, the region generates a gross regional product of over 4.5 billion
dollars. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SURVEY, CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MAR-
KET 1 (Chemical Bank New York Trust Company, 1968); OVERSEAS BUSINESS RE-
PORTS, BASIC DATA OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 1 (U.S. Dep't
Commerce Pub. No. 70-43, Sept. 1970).
2 Grunwald, Foreign Private Investment: The Challenge of Latin American Nation-
alism, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 228, 237, 245 (1971). Private investment capital increased
from $17.1 million in 1960 to $130 million in 1965. Gordon, Joint Business Adven-
tures in the Central American Common Market, 21 VAND; L. REV. 315, 316 (1968).
The gross inflow of foreign capital was $309 million in 1967. Grunwald, supra at 245.
3 Rubin, Multinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty: A Skeptic's Analysis,
3 LAW & POLICY INT'L BuS. 1, 8 (1971); Chase Manhattan Bank, The Impact Abroad
of U.S. Direct Investments, WORLD BUS. Nov. 1966, at 5.
4 INTER-AmERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, MULTINATIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF LATIN AMERICAN 24, 25 (1968).
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road system. Finally, the foreign government shares indirectly in
the profits through taxes or, in the case of a concession or joint
venture, directly through participation in the profits.
The Central American Common Market (CACM) has provided
another incentive for investment by adopting the Agreement on the
System of Central American Integrated Industries.'
Before discussing the Agreement in detail, the form and content
of the CACM will be considered to provide a comprehensive under-
standing of the investment possibilities in Central America. The
Agreement will then be analyzed, and finally a form of investment
will be suggested that maximizes the benefits both to the investor
and the country or region.
II. THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
The economic rationale for regional integration varies and is
not the same :as the free trade rationale that prompted the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The free trade ra-
tionale is premised on the notion that where comparative cost ratios
differ among the States, each State will specialize in producing the
product in which it has a comparative advantage.' Since the State
with a comparative advantage will specialize, thereby becoming
more efficient and able to produce goods at a lower cost, it will
export these products. Without protective tariffs, States who receive
these goods will find it to their advantage to specialize in another
product which they can produce and export more efficiently. By
buying those products in which it has a comparative disadvantage
from the other States, each State allows for the most efficient allo-
cation of world resources. This follows because each State mini-
mizes the resources it must use to maximize its consumption.7
On the other hand, regionalism,8 where a common external tar-
iff is imposed by all the States within the region upon all those
5 This treaty [hereinafter cited as Agreement on Integrated Industries] and its pro-
tocols are reprinted in INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STUDIES, INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF LATIN
AMERICA 86-116 (1968) [hereinafter cited as INSTRUMENTS]. The Agreement with-
out the protocols is found in J. PINCUS, THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MAR-
KET App. (1962), and MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN LATIN AMER-
ICA 23, U.N. Doc. E/CN.12/621 (1962).
6 See generally J. PEN, A PRIMER ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1967).
7 Id. at 12-20.
8 Regionalism Was developed to ease the deteriorating terms of trade, eliminate
erratic fluctuations of export income, and stabilize the balance of payments. See Baran-
son, Industrialization and Regionalism in Central America, 16 INTER-AM. ECON. AFF.
87 (1962).
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without, conflicts with the free trade theory since it allows the en-
tire region to produce at a comparative disadvantage and thus in-
hibits free trade. The economic rationale for regionalism has been
articulated by Dr. Raul Prebisch,9 as being based on the concept of
the world being divided into two basic economies; industrialized
center economies and nonindustrialized periphery economies. The
five periphery economies of Central America are at a distinct dis-
advantage because they depend upon commodity exports to pay for
imported manufactured goods. The problem in Central America is
that export prices for agricultural and mining products have de-
clined in relation to the import prices for manufactured and in-
dustrial goods. This problem arises because the demand for Cen-
tral American products is relatively inelastic whereas the demand
for manufactured and industrial goods is relatively elastic. Since
there is monopoly pricing at the center and competitive pricing by
the numerous periphery suppliers, the Central American economies
are kept at a perpetual disadvantage.
The Prebisch-ECLA (the United Nations Economic Commission
for Latin America) rationale also contends that increases in pro-
ductivity at the periphery tend to be passed on to the center. Pro-
ductivity advances in the economies' of the Central American ex-
port sector increase world supplies. This increase either lowers
world prices or forces a reduction in domestic employment. A syn-
drome is thus created so that when wages in Central America are
low in relation to increases in productivity, more labor is drawn into
the export sector producing overproduction, low prices, and unem-
ployment again.
To solve this problem, the Prebisch-ECLA group suggests a
shift of labor and resources from agriculture and extractive sectors
to manufacturing and industry."° They contend that industrializa-
tion will cure the demand deficiency for Central American exports,
increase national income, and stabilize the balance of payments.
The policy suggested is industrialization and import substitution
- the domestic production of goods formerly imported. Domestic
industries will eventually absorb underemployment from the agri-
cultural and extractive sectors causing the aggregate national income
9 Dr. Prebisch was head of the United Nations Commission for Latin America.
For a discussion of his views on regionalism, see R. HANSEN, CENTRAL AMERICAN
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19 (1967). See also Bar-
anson, supra note 8, at 87-95. Cf. Gigax, The Central American Common Market, 16
INTER-AM. ECON. AFF. 59-77 (1962).
10 Baranson, supra note 8, at 88.
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to increase because of the shift from the less productive agricultural
and extractive products to manufactured products. Further indus-
trialization will train an industrialized labor force and bring in more
technology from abroad. Finally, industrialization will stabilize
further fluctuation and ease the balance of payments since there is
less dependence upon the agricultural and extractive sectors.
The foregoing is accomplished primarily by imposing protective
tariffs to shield infant industries which are at a disadvantage because
of deficiencies in skills and in economies of scale. Industrialization
will encourage economic planning for intrastructure development in
transportation, power, and human resources. Regional integration
will provide the necessary market even though the goods may be
produced at a lower cost on the world market.
The critics of the Prebisch-ECLA doctrine argue that the prob-
lem is not one of a demand deficiency but rather the inability of
lesser developed countries to be flexible and adaptable in their sup-
ply." The Central American economies cannot shift production
as world demand conditions change and, therefore, they cannot reach
their export potential. Thus industrialization may lead to a con-
centration on domestic production while ignoring export opportu-
nities. Furthermore, the critics argue that import substitution does
not stabilize the balance of payments since it adds a demand for im-
ported capital goods, raw materials, parts, and fuel. 2 According to
customs union theorists, economic integration is beneficial when it
leads to trade creation and harmful when it leads to trade diver-
sion.' 3 Trade diversion results when goods formerly imported
from countries outside the region are replaced by intraregional trade
and the intraregional suppliers are less efficient than the importers.
The problem, according to the critics, is how to use the existing
productive capacities efficiently, stimulate new investment in indus-
tries not viable in a single State, and provide an increasing oppor-
tunity for specialization and economies of scale to allow the States
to alter their economies in an efficient manner.' 4
Because the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America played a leading role in the formation of the CACM, the
Prebisch-ECLA theory has been the basis for economic integration
11 R. HANSEN, supra note 9, at 19.
12Id. at 19-23.
"3 J. MEADE, THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS (1955); D. RAMSETT, REGIONAL
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA 10-12 (1969); J. VINER, THE
CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (1950).
14 R .HANSEN, supra note 9, at 34.
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in Central America. The tendency has been to emphasize industries
which will reduce the CACM's dependence upon using export in-
come to import manufactured products.' Import substitution, com-
plementary industrial growth, and infrastruceure development have
been proposed to accomplish this goal. 6 This economic theory has
lead to the adoption of the treaties which are the basis of the
CACM."
III. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL
AMERICAN COMMON MARKET
A. The Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and
Central American Economic Integration8
The Multilateral Treaty established a "free trade regime" which
was to be completely implemented within ten years from the effec-
tive date of the treaty. To accomplish this, the States agreed to
abolish customs duties and charges among themselves for products
15 Id. at 18.
16ld. at 18; INTER-AMERIcAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, THE IDB AND LATIN
AMERICAN INTEGRATION 19-24 (mimeograph, 1970).
17 The three basic legal instruments are the Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and
Central American Economic Integration, signed June 10, 1958, 454 U.N.T.S. 70; the
General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, signed Dec. 13, 1960, 455
U.N.T.S. 68; and the Central American Agreement on the Equalization of Imports
Duties and Charges, signed Sept. 1, 1959, 454 U.N.T.S. 368, and its protocols. See
INSTRUMENTS, supra note 5, at 86-88.
The special instruments include the following: The Agreement on the System of
Central American Integrated Industries, signed June 10, 1958, id. at 89, and its proto-
cols, id. at 94-116; the Agreement on Fiscal Incentives for Industrial Development,
signed July 31, 1962, id. at 117.
In the sphere of monetary policy, the following agreements have allowed Central
America to move towards a monetary union in the process of promoting development:
the Agreement Establishing the Central American Bank for Economic Integration,
signed Dec. 13, 1960, id. at 143: the Agreement Establishing the Central American
Clearing House, signed July 28, 1961, id. at 153 (to promote trade and facilitate trans-
actions among members); and the Agreement Establishing a Central American Mone-
tary Union, signed Feb. 25, 1964, id. at 161 (which would create a common accounting
unit, the Central American Peso, equal to the U.S. dollar).
Other important documents include: the Central American Uniform Tariff Nomen-
clature (NAUCA, 1953), which is a uniform system of import commodity classifica-
tions upon which the uniform tariff is based; the Basic Agreement on Technical As-
sistance between the United Nations and the Governments of Costa Rica, Guatemala,
Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador, signed Mar. 10, 1954, id. at 195, which estab-
lished the Central American Advanced School of Public Administration (ESAPAC)
which trains public officials, studies administrative problems, and provides a source of
public administrators for the region; and the Agreement Establishing the Central Amer-
ican Institute of Research and Industrial Technology (ICAITI), final signature Sept.
27, 1955, id. at 190, which was formed to contribute to the improvement and growth
of industry through technical advice and planning.
18 Signed June 10, 1958, 454 U.N.T.S. 70 (hereinafter cited as Multilateral Treaty).
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listed on Schedule A, which was appended to the Multilateral
Treaty. This Schedule listed some 200 products which were exempt
from import duties, export duties, and taxes levied on imports and
exports by all levels of government. 9 : Goods originating in the
region and included in the Schedule were to be given "the same
treatment as domestic goods" and were to be exempt from quotas."0
The Multilateral Treaty was designed to free trade efficiently
within the region without upsetting each State's economy.21  Spe-
cifically, free trade may result in losses of government revenue due
to products of the participating States being brought in duty free.
Free trade can also increase competition for the State's domestic
industries since industries of the other States participating in the
free trade area are allowed to compete with them. Finally, dispari-
ties in development among the participants and in their national
policies, such as tax and tariff incentives, may widen due to the
ability of capital and labor to shift freely. For these reasons, the
terms of the Multilateral Treaty were purposely left broad, and the
specific means to obtain the objectives were not spelled out. "The
free trade zone was to be perfected - in the GATT sense of ac-
cording national treatment to a substantial fraction of their recipro-
cal trade - by means of periodic multilateral negotiations designed
to incorporate additional products into the original list."2 2  Accord-
ing to one commentator, "the objective of rapid liberalization of
trade gave way to the need to minimize disturbances. ' 23  This,
however, led to a major defect in the Multilateral Treaty - any
State could avoid the inclusion of an item in the Schedule by veto-
ing it in the negotiation.
B. The General Treaty on Central American
Economic Integration4
The nucleus of the CACM is the General Treaty, signed in 1960
and finally ratified by all five States three years later. The General
Treaty takes precedence over the Multilateral Treaty and any other
previous treaties on free trade among the five States but it does not
'9 Art. I, 454 U.N.T.S. 70, 72.
20 Art. II, id. at 72.
21 C. CASTILLO, GROWTH AND INTEGRATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA 81-83 (1966).
22 Id. at 82.
23 ld. at 83.
24 Signed Dec. 13, 1960, 455 U.N.T.S. 68 [hereinafter cited as General Treaty].
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affect the validity of those agreements.25 The States must adopt a
uniform tariff in accordance with the terms of the Central American
Agreement on the Equalization of Import Duties and Charges. "
The parties endorsed the provisions of the Agreement on the System
of Central American Integrated Industries27 and agreed to establish
the Central American Bank for Economic Integration.28
"Within the framework of !the common import tariff, the Gen-
eral Treaty provides a different solution to the question of intra-
regional trade, where the need to minimize disturbance in the exist-
ing systems has now given way to rapid progress in the free trade
front."2 The procedure is certainly different from that of the Multi-
lateral Treaty which limited the products receiving preferential
treatment to a small schedule. The General Treaty frees all goods
produced in Central America from duties, except those on the list
of temporary exceptions.30
Free trade treatment is granted to all products originating in
their respective territories except for goods contained in the special
regimes."' These special interim regimes exempti specific products
from immediate free trade but incorporate them into the free trade
area within five years. The origin of the goods is to be determined
by bilateral negotiation, or if that fails, then by the intervention of
the Executive Council.3 2 However, goods simply assembled, wrapped,
packed, cut or diluted are not considered to originate in Central
America.
The General Treaty also deals with export subsidies and unfair
business practices.33 Each party is forbidden to grant a subsidy to
goods exported into the region or to "maintain any system" which
allows goods to be sold in the region at a price lower than their do-
mestic market price. Price fixing and price discrimination consti-
tute an indirect export subsidy if the price is lower than that re-
2 5Art. XXVII, id. at 90.
2 6Art. II, id. at 70. See note 17 supra.
27 Art. XVII, 455 U.N.T.S. 68. See note 17 supra.
28 Art. XVIII, id. at 84. Before any country can obtain a loan or guarantee from
the Bank it must have signed and ratified the General Treaty, the Multilateral Treaty,
the Agreement on Integrated Industries, and the Agreement on the Equalization of Im-
port Duties and Charges. See Agreement Constituting the Central American Bank for
Economic Integration, signed Dec. 13, 1960,455 U.N.T.S. 216.
29 C. CASTILLO, supra note 21, at 87.
301d. at 87.
.31 Art. III, 455 U.N.T.S. at 70. These special interim regimes are defined in Arti-
cle IV as exempting products from immediate free trade. Art. IV, id. at 72.
32 Art. V, id. at 72.
3 3 Arts. IX-XIV, id. at 76-80.
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suiting from normal competition. On the other hand, tax refunds
of a general nature to encourage the production of a specific good
are not considered to be an export subsidy. Similarly, an exemp-
tion from external taxes in the exporting State is not an export sub-
sidy nor is the sale of foreign currency on the free market at a
higher than official rate.
The General Treaty further provides mechanisms for industrial
development. It assures full freedom of transit for goods in ve-
hicles, grants national treatment to enterprises of other signatory
States in the construction of economic infrastructure as well as re-
quiring the parties to adopt several other agreements.8 4  Finally,
the General Treaty requires the States to insure reasonable equaliza-
tion of the relevant laws and regulations with a view towards estab-
lishing uniform tax incentives for industrial development. 5
The institutional framework which implements the General
Treaty is different from that established under the Multilateral
Treaty. There are now three institutions to carry out the mandates
of the General Treaty. The first, the Economic Council, is com-
prised of the member States' Ministers of Economic Affairs and
has the stated purpose of "integrating the Central American econ-
omies and coordinating the economic policy of the Contracting
States. ' ' 6 The Economic Council is given the authority to examine
the work of the Executive Council and has the duty of insuring that
resolutions on economic integration are implemented. Thus, the
basic duty of the Economic Council is to direct and coordinate eco-
nomic integration.
The major burden of the application and administration of the
General Treaty is put in the hands of the Executive Council. The
Executive Council consists of one official and one alternate ap-
pointed by each State and can meet as often as required or when it
is convened by the Permanent Secretariat. Procedurally, it adopts
resolutions by majority vote, however, if there is a deadlock, the
Economic Council decides the matter. The power vested in the
Executive Council is vague. "The Executive Council shall take such
measures as it may deem necessary to ensure fulfillment of the com-
mitment entered into under this Treaty and to settle problems aris-
ing from the implementation of its provisions.""
34 See notes 27 & 28 supra.
35 Art. XIX, 455 U.N.T.S. at 84.
86 Art. XX, id. at 86.
37 Art. XXI, id. at 86.
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The third, and perhaps the most dynamic, organ is the Perma-
nent Secretariat (SIECA) which was "initiated, as a juridical per-
son, and shall act as such both for the Central American Economic
Council and the Executive Council.""8  SIECA can establish the
departments and sections necessary to perform its functions which
are: to insure that the treaties of economic integration are properly
executed; to implement resolutions adopted by the Economic Coun-
cil and the Executive Council; and to perform the functions as-
signed to it by the Executive Council.
C. The Central American Agreement on the
Equalization of Import Duties and Charges9
The purpose of this Agreement was to "establish a common
tariff policy and decide to set up a Central American import tariff
consistent with the integration and economic development require-
ments of Central America. '1 40  Common external tariffs were to be
esablished immediately for items listed on one schedule appended
to the Equalization Agreement and tariffs on a second schedule were
to be equalized within five years .4 '
The Central American States realized when they signed the
Equalization Agreement in 1959 that it was not possible to agree
on the same level of tariff commitment.4 2  Although it is generally
,agreed that the larger the scope of trade liberalization the more
important uniform external tariffs become,48 the level of develop-
ment differs greatly among the five member States, and each 'State's
commitment to tariff equalization varies. On the other hand, a de-
veloping pattern of tariffs would benefit the States with lower
duties. Therefore, when the Equalization Agreement was signed,
the external tariffs were to be established through item-by-item ne-
gotiations. The quantative guidelines agreed upon were low for
88 Art. XXIII-XXIV, id. at 88. See note 67 infra & accompanying text.
89 Signed Sept. 1, 1969, 454 U.N.T.S. 368 [hereinafter cited as Equalization Agree-
ment].
40 Art. I, id. at 370.
41 Id. (Article I read in conjunction with Article II). The Equalization Agreement
also set forth the following preferences of goods to be added to the schedules: a. Com-
modities for which trade liberalization is provided under bilateral free trade' treaties; b.
Good manufactured in Central America; c. Imported goods for which goods produced
in central America may be substituted in the short run; d. The raw materials, inter-
mediate products, and containers required for the production and sale of items in a, b,
and c; e. Other goods. See Art III, id. at 370.
42 C. CASTILLO, supra note 21, at 83-85.
43 Id. at 83.
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capital goods, raw materials, and production goods not produced in
Central America; moderate for consumer goods not capable of being
regionally produced for several years; and high for those goods pro-
duced in Central America or capable of being produced there in the
short run.44 Thus, the Agreement helped to accomplish three goals
of regional integration. It provided common external tariff protec-
tion which, in turn, facilitated import substitution, and promoted
industrial development in the region.
Where the changes in the external tariff involved a substantial
alteration from the preexisting national tariff, the Equalization
Agreement established an interim system of progressive equaliza-
tion.45  The first change in the initial tariff came 12 months after
the Equalization Agreement became effective and modifications were
made annually until the agreed duty was reached - the total time
not to exceed five years. By 1969, a common external tariff had
been established on 95.2 percent of the items in the tariff nomencla-
ture. Another .7 percent is scheduled to be equalized by 1972.46
D. The Operation of the Central American
Common Market
Initially the CACM was very successful. 7  Evidence of the close
ties among the five member States includes the fact that trade had
increased about 350 percent to a total of $176 million between 1960
and 1966. Intraregional trade in manufacturing had increased over
600 percent to $125 million, and imports originating in the region
had risen from 6 percent in 1960 to 18 percent in 1966.48 By 1970
intraregional trade had reached $286 million.4' These facts support
the conclusion that the elimination of internal trade barriers in-
creased the size of the domestic market and stimulated intraregional
trade. Over 98 percent of the items on the tariff schedule were
being traded duty free within the region by 1968 and today only
a few products are not being traded freely.'0 All five States are
44 d. at 84.
45 Art. XIV, 454 U.N.T.S. 380.
46 OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, FOREIGN TRADE REGULATIONS OF THE CENTRAL
AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 1 (U.S. Dep't Commerce Pub. No. 70-66, Nov. 1970).
47 See C. CASTILLO, supra note 21; R. HANSEN, supra note 9; Chase Manhattan
Bank, Central American Common Market, WORLD Bus., 1968, at 14-16: Nye, Cen-
tral American Regional Integration, in INTERNATIONAL REGIONALISM 378 (J. Nye
ed. 1968). See also Tables I & 2 infra.
48 Chase Manhattan Bank, supra note 47, at 14.
49 See Table I infra.
5 0 OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
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offering tax incentives and tariff advantages to encourage new in-
dustries that would not compete with those already within the re-
gion.
However, the CACM has faced serious difficulties. While all
States have gained from integration, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and
Guatemala have benefited the most due to their advanced industrial
structure. On the other hand, the agricultural exports of Honduras
and Nicaragua have made only limited gains,51 leading to the dis-
satisfaction of these States. Secondly, American businessmen saw
the protective tariff as impairing the quality of industrialization and
felt that import substitution had little long-range dynamism in such
a small market where income is distributed unevenly.5 2
Faced with the above accomplishments and problems, the task
falls on the CACM institutional nexus to provide the initiative to
continue the expansion of the Common Market. The impact of the
Central American institutions and their ability to implement a
functional approach"3 to problem-solving holds the answer to the
question of the viability of the Common Market. The functional-
ist approach in the operation of a common market "seeks out semi-
technical tasks with a high degree of political relevance - and es-
tablishes supranational bureaucracies to deal with the tasks. ' 54
Since the ultimate ends are left ambiguous and new tasks are en-
couraged to "spill-over" 55 into the regional institution, the institu-
tional nexus will become the focal point for decision-making with a
minimal amount of political friction.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. BUSINESS 9 (U.S. Dep't Commerce Pub. No. 69-7, Apr. 1969).
See also Cable, The "Football War" and the CACM, 45 INT'L AFF. 658, 664 (1969).
51 This is reflected in the intraregional trade figures. See Table I infra.
52 Chase Manhattan Bank, supra note 47, at 14.
53 One commentator noted that "t) he basic argument of 'functionalism' as a theory
of international organization is for a minimal frontal attack on state sovereignty, which
is gradually made irrelevant by a reordering of the world along technical-functional
lines." Nye, supra note 47, at 380. Functionalism, relying upon the relationship of
the economic and social sectors, and the impetus of technocrats, persuades the individ-
ual governments to allow one common task to "spill-over" into another. Thus the
regional organization gradually usurps the functions of the governments, and loyalties
and expectations are refocused to the developing center (i.e., the regional institutional
nexus). See generally E. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE (1958); Regional Inte.
gration: Theory and Research, 24 INT'L ORGANIZATION 607 (1970).
54 Nye, supra note 47, at 380.
55 "Spill-over" refers to the process whereby tasks formerly accomplished by the
national governments shift to the regional institutions due to the natural links be-
tween the economic and social sectors and the prodding of the technocrats of the re-
gional institutions. Id. The concept of spill-over is further developed in Schmitter,
Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International Integration, 23 INT'L ORGANI-
ZATION 162 (1969) and Schmitter, A Revised Theory of Regional Integration, 24
INT'L ORGANIZATION 837 (1970). Spill-over is defined as the process whereby the
1971]
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The actions of the institutions must be sufficiently concentrated
to be effective. Similar tasks cannot be allowed to "spill-around,"
such as being allowed to flow to different institutions each time,
with the likely consequence of being duplicated by two institutions.
The relationship between State and regional institutions must be
such that a consistent policy is achieved - where both are acting
in concert with each other. Because Central American regional
institutions have already absorbed many of the available trained
personnel in Central America, they have the technical know-how
and are the best equipped to handle the experimental and opera-
tional phases of economic integration.56 In addition, the main-
tenance of several Central American institutions (such as the Exec-
utive Council, Permanent Secretariat, CABEI, Clearing House,
ICAITI, and Monetary Council), with individual staffs and tasks,
results in a diffusion of political attention as more than one insti-
tution must be focused upon. This has the beneficial effect of lower-
ing the level of politicization of the Common Market as a whole.
Where there are several competent centers formulating and im-
plementing economic integration, the operations must be coordi-
nated. The General Treaty assigned this task to the Economic and
Executive Councils.5" The problem that arises is that the members
of these councils are also the ministers of the national governments
and consequently they sometimes have conflicting loyalties. As a
practical matter then a shifting and strengthening of SIECA and
the specialized institutions5" is necessary to insure further integra-
tion.
Internal pressures have recently put considerable stress on the
regional institutions. For example, the political turmoil in Guate-
mala, the seat of SIECA, has adversely affected the integration
process.5 9 The war between El Salvador and Honduras has affected
the Common Market adversely since Honduras refused to take part
in the regional meetings and closed the inter-American highway to
authority for regional institutions to allocate values (level) is increased and the type of
issues to be jointly resolved (scope) is expanded.
56 C. CASTILLO, supra note 2 1, at 122.
57 Arts. XX, XXI, & XXII, 455 U.N.T.S. 86.
58 These include the Clearing House, CABEI, ICAITI, ESPAC, and the Monetary
Council.
59 The turmoil is evinced by the following: United States military advisors have
been murdered, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister was kidnapped and exchanged for
guerilla leaders, and in 1970 the West German ambassador was kidnapped and mur
dered. See Simmonds, International Economic Organizations in Central and Latin
America and the Caribbean: Regionalism and Subregionalism in the Integration Pro-
cess, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 376, 377-78 (1970).
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Salvadorian goods 00 This affected the :level of intraregional trade
in 1969.6" It has been stated in regard to the war that: "The effect
of the conflict upon the potential development of foreign investment
in the region should not be underestimated; in the final analysis
this may represent a setback from which it will be difficult to re-
cover." 
6 2
One of the more prominent legal problems facing the CACM
is that the States have been reluctant to give the regional institutions
any power. The power that the regional institutions currently have
has largely been obtained by spill-over.' However, this allows the
States to preempt institutional powers by the use of diplomatic in-
struments. The treaties and protocols, which must be negotiated,
signed, and ratified by each State, are still the primary means to
achieve major policy implementations, even though the process may
take months.' On the other hand, each State has limited its respec-
tive sovereignty by signing independent trade agreements, .using
tariff mechanisms to solve balance of payment problems and limit-
ing the granting of fiscal incentives to certain industries. 4
The various treaties and protocols have provided a legal frame-
work for a viable Common Market. In its short existence CACM
has stimulated and changed the intraregional trade so that the value
of industrial products exceeds 'that of the agricultural and the ex-
tractive sectors. 5  External trade has increased and items that are
imported are not principally produced within the region nor are
60 The war, sometimes called the football war, was started when El Salvador in-
vaded Honduras for alleged attacks by Hondurans on Salvadorian settlers. The hos-
tility followed the competition between the two countries for the World Cup which
brought the situation to a head. However, the underlying causes of the hostility lie in
the fact that El Salvador has severe demographic problems - a shortage of land and
a high birth rate. This has led to the emigration of over three hundred thousand Sal-
vadorians to Honduras. Honduras, which has not fared as well as the more developed
Central American nations under the common market, has consequently encountered a
rising rate of unemployment and an adverse balance of payments situation with El
Salvador. Cable, supra note 50, at 658.
61 In 1969, Honduran exports to El Salvador dropped from 14.8 million dollars
in 1968 to 7.3 million dollars. Honduran imports dropped from 23.2 million dollars
in 1968 to 12.4 million in 1969. This accounts for most of the decline in the total
amount of Honduran exports from 31.3 to 23.9 million dollars from 1968 to 1969.
See SIECA, Information Letters, May & June 1971.
6 2 Simmonds, supra note 59, at 380. See also OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS,
WORLD TRADE OUTLOOK FOR LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN 6 (U.S. Dep't. Com-
merce Pub. No. 70-80, Dec. 1970).
63 See, for example, the designation process for integrated industries discussed in
note 83 infra & accompanying text.
6 4 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SURVEY, CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET
9, 21 (Chemical Bank New York Trust Company, 1968).
65 Simmonds, supra note 59, at 379.
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the items essential to industrial development. However, the
treaties have not provided effective mechanisms for economic inte-
gration in several instances. A regional highway program and tele-
communications system have not come about and both are essential
to industrial infrastructure development. The Central American
Bank for Economic Integration has had less of an impact than ex-
pected and the Clearing House and Monetary Council have had
difficulty in functioning." In spite of this, SIECA has been able to
function fairly efficiently and has provided some much needed lead-
ership and dynamism.6 One commentator has observed:
The custom union that now exists in the region, with a free in-
ternal market and a common external tariff on almost all imports
from outside, cannot, however, be transformed into a single in-
tegrated economic unit unless some of the regional programmes
and the institutions set up to implement them, can be revived and
agreement can be reached on a number of matters, such as fiscal re-
form, the balanced intra-regional allocation of new industries, and
the fredom of movement of labor, which have obviously strong
political overtones.68
The problem has been stated, but it remains to be seen if the insti-
tutions can respond in the future. Growing politicization of inte-
gration problems is considered a sign of progress towards a true
economic union." On the other hand, if politicization occurs at a
rate faster than the development of common loyalties to the regional
institutions, the result is a spill-back70 until the institutions and tasks
of the regional organization return to a level which the community
loyalties and expectations can support.7 '
Regionalism and the CACM have several important supporting
factors. The growing number of supranational technocrats and in-
stitutions are able to focus their attention on creating a viable
Common Market. The fact that economic tasks have in the past
remained separated from political tasks, has initially proved to be a
stabilizing effect. Spill-over will necessitate more politicization, but
66 Id. at 380.
6 The growth of SIECA is apparent from the fact that its budget and staff were
doubled in the first six years. Also, the departments on trade and taxes have been
added to those of infrastructure, agriculture, market, industry, statistics, law, publica-
tions, and administration. In practice, tasks have increased and the Secretariat has
gained some minor de facto executive powers. See Nye, supra note 47, at 410.
68 Simmonds, supra note 59, at 380.
69 Nye, supra note 47, at 422.
70 Spill-back is a stagnation that leads to a retrogression of loyalties and tasks to the
national level.
71 Nye, supra note 47, at 422.
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in the short run, political and economic separability will tend to
keep the level of politicization low. The increased economic inter-
dependence due to increased regional trade, common industrial
policies, minimal infrastructure development, and the monetary
union is also a cohesive factor. The past success of the CACM and
the cooperation of international agencies in providing a favorable
international setting is a positive reinforcement for the continued
efforts towards integration.
It is within this framework that the Agreement on the System
of Integrated Industries72 and the investment opportunities in Cen-
tral America must be considered. The economic theory, legal ap-
paratus, and institutional structure are oriented towards industrial-
ization. The problem is how to provide a setting that will attract
foreign investors while minimizing the cost of their investment.
IV. INTEGRATED INDUSTRIES AND
INCREASED INVESTMENT
A. The Agreement on the System of Integrated Industries
In accordance with the Prebisch-ECLA concept of developing
Central America, this Agreement has two purposes. The first ob-
jective is to promote the rational use of development resources.73
The second objective is to encourage the establishment of industries
which require free access to the entire region in order to operate un-
der reasonably economic and competitive conditions even at mini-
mum capacity. 74
The rational use of development resources is to be accomplished
by promoting new industries and specializing and expanding exist-
ing industries so that every Central American State may progres-
sively derive economic advantage. This implies that a shortage of
resources in capital, skilled 'labor, and technical knowledge requires
a rational priority to avoid several small-scale, high-cost factories
that would absorb these valuable resources, and compete with each
other within the region. The single industry restriction to meet
the entire region's demand results in an economy of scale, namely
large-scale, low-cost production. Thus the Agreement on Integrated
Industries provides for the rational use of resources by discouraging
duplication and competition where the demand for the product is
only large enough to support one firm.
72 Signed June 10, 1958, INSTRUMENTS, supra note 5, at 89.
73 Art. 1, id. at 89-90.
74 Art. II, id. at 90.
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To insure that industrial development is distributed evenly
throughout the region, the Agreement on Integrated Industries pro-
vides that each State must receive one integrated industry before
any can receive a second.75 However, there is no provision for an
equal distribution after each State has received one, save the men-
tion of the development of activities on an "equitable basis." There
is a tendency towards uneven distribution because of labor factors,
transportation costs, proximity to market, availability of financing,
level of existing industrial development, and investment climate.
Hence the most the Agreement on Integrated Industries can do is
reduce the unevenness. The Agreement cannot prevent uneven dis-
tribution because it is applicable to only a particular type of industry
(those to be integrated). The establishment of one integrated in-
dustry, though, may stimulate the development of supportive in-
dustries.
The second objective of the Agreement was intended to be ac-
complished by permitting the products of the integrated industry
to move freely throughout the region, while similar products of non-
integrated industries would not enjoy regional free trade for a period
of ten years. However, the ten years have passed and this benefit
is no longer available because intramarket duties have been almost
completely eliminated.
The remaining benefits that can be obtained under the Agree-
ment on Integrated Industries and its protocols 76 are substantial.
The integrated industry enjoys external tariff protection while mak-
ing its products competitive with those of foreign producers. The
integrated industry is entitled to duty exemptions on the importa-
tion of raw materials and intermediate goods for a ten year period."
These industries are also exempt from taxes levied on the produc-
tion or consumption of such raw materials and intermediate prod-
ucts.78  The governments of the five States are required to give
preference to the products of the integrated industries when they
buy,7" and the integrated industries are protected against dump-
ing.80
75 Transitional Article, id. at 94. See generally Cochrane, Central American Eco-
nomic Integration: The "Integrated Industries" Scheme, 19 INTER-AM. EcON. AFF. 63
(1965).
76 For Protocols I & II, see INSTRUMENTS, supra note 5, at 94, 109.
77 Protocol I, Art. VI, id. at 96.
78 Id.
79 Agreement on Integrated Industries, Art. VII, id. at 91.
80 If the foreign exporter dumps in the region (sells his product in Central America
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If a firm meets certain requirements imposed on price, quality,
and capacity, irrespective of whether it is integrated, then duties on
competing imports from outside the region may be increased under
the Special System for the Promotion of Production.8 Similarly,
advantages may be obtained under the Central American Agree-
ment on Fiscal Incentives to Industrial Development,82 including
the total exemption from customs duties in raw materials and inter-
mediate goods, the total exemption from income taxes, and exemp-
tion from property and asset taxes.
To become a regionally integrated industry a firm must go
through a designation procedure that is both long and uncertain.8
This extended process is due to the unwillingness of the individual
States to view the integrated industries scheme as regional. The
necessity of a separate protocol that must be ratified by each of the
States, permits them to be protective of their national interest at
the expense of the Agreement.
Since it may take several years to become an integrated indus-
try, the procedure should be streamlined to encourage more industries
to apply for this status. The procedure that this writer suggests
at a price lower than that on the international market) the importation of his product
is suspended. Protocol I, Art. VIII, id. at 96-97. See D. RAMsmrT, REGIONAL IN-
DUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA 38-40 (1969).
81 Protocol I, Arts. XXVIII-XXXVII, INSTRUMENTS, supra note 5, at 105-07
(which is Chapter IV of the first protocol to the Agreement on Integrated Indus-
tries). See D. RAMSETT, supra note 80, at 79-80. Tariffs on competing goods may
still be raised for protection from goods from outside the region. To qualify, the in-
dustry must manufacture goods not produced elsewhere within the region, it must pres-
ently be producing the goods, and finally, it must show that it can produce at least
one half of the demand for the region at reasonable prices. This protection has been
granted for the production of electric light bulbs, glass containers, flat glass, tools,
and machetes. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 64, at 16.
82 INSTRUMENTS, supra note 5, at 117. See id. at 135, for the Protocol granting
preferential treatment to Honduras. For a complete discussion of the Agreement on
Fiscal Incentives to Industrial Development, see Gillim, The Fiscal Aspects of the Cen-
tral American Common Market, in 2 FISCAL HARMONIZATION IN COMMON MAR-
KETS 479 (C. Shoup ed. 1967). See also OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, supra note 50,
at 10.
83 D. RAMSETT, supra note 80, at 43. The procedure is as follows: (1) Application
to the Secretariat (SIECA), usually by the firm in conjunction with the national govern-
ment, by a report listing the conditions of demand, probable costs, and amount and
sources of capital; (2) With the approval of SIECA, the report is passed on to the Exec-
utive Council - two or three months is usually required for their ruling; (3) If the Ex-
ecutive Council approves the application, it asks ICAITI to examine the economic feasi-
bility of the project; (4) ICAITI reports to SIECA; (5) SIECA prepares a report
recommending the project if -the other reports are favorable; (6) Both the ICAITI
and SIEVA reports are given to the Executive Council and it draws up a protocol
which is signed by the Executive Council; and (7) Finally, and most importantly, the
protocol must be ratified by each State. Three States must ratify it for the firm to begin
operations, but it can only operate in those three countries.
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is an application to SIECA by a report listing the conditions of de-
mand, probable costs, and amount and sources of capital. If it
approves, SIECA would then pass the report to ICAITI to examine
the economic feasibility and ICAITI would then pass the report
to the Executive Council along with SIECA's recommendations for
a final decision. This procedure eliminates the passing of the proj-
ect back and forth among the regional institutions; with each in-
stitution only seeing it once. Secondly, the necessity for each State
to ratify the protocol is eliminated. Unfortunately, each State jeal-
ously guards its rights to keep the integrated industry from operat-
ing within its borders. Each State fears that without its veto there
would be an uneven distribution of the new industrial development
with it on the short end. Although, each State is represented on
the Executive Council, matters are decided by majority vote and it
is unlikely that the States will give up the protocol method unless
some further guarantee of balanced development is made.
The impact of the Agreement on Integrated Industries so far has
been minimal.84 In 1961, the five members each proposed an indus-
try to be integrated. One of the proposed plants was already in
operation on the national level in Guatemala.8" In 1963, Guate-
mala's proposal was set back when Costa Rica applied for a second
plant to be built by Firestone in the same industry.86 SIECA re-
plied to Costa Rica by stating that the internal demand in the re-
gion was not sufficient to warrant a second plant and denied Costa
Rica's application. Nicaragua proposed that a caustic soda plant and
an insecticide plant be integrated, even though the Agreement pre-
vented the establishment of two plants until each State had an inte-
grated industry.87 SIECA decided that the two plants were so closely
interconnected that they could be considered as one, since chlorine,
a by-product of caustic soda, can be used to make insecticides. Con-
sequently, Nicaragua's application was granted.88 In 1965, Hon-
84 INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, THE IDB AND LATIN AMERICAN
INTEGRATION 21 (mimeograph, 1970). See also Cable, supra note 50, at 664.
85 GINSA - Gran Industria de Neumaticos Centro Americanos - Guatemala's tire
and tube plant was founded in 1956 and was declared an integrated industry in 1963.
See D. RAMSETT, supra note 80, at 90-118.
86 Id. at 47. Costa Rica made this application before ratifying the Agreement.
87 Granting one State two integrated industries would violate the transitional article
which requires that "the Contracting States not award a second plant to any one coun-
try until all of the Central American countries have each been assigned a plant in com-
formity with the protocols specified in Article III." INSTRUMENTS, supra note 5, at
94.
88 Protocol I, id. at 94.
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duras was granted an integrated industry in the window or plate
glass industry.89
During 1966 and 1967, seven applications were submitted, with
each State submitting at least one proposal. These applications were
competitive and unrealistic." Furthermore, the transitional article
was in the way of developing additional integrated industries until
each State had one. To circumvent this problem, the Economic
Council reinterpreted the unambiguous transitional article to mean
that a second integrated plant cannot be assigned within the "same
industry" to any State until a plant in the "same industry" has been
assigned to each of the remaining States.9 According to one
writer, this interpretation has been a factor in spurring new applica-
tions for integrated industries.9 2
To encourage new integrated industries, the Executive Council,
SIECA, and ICAITI should initiate plans for a practical and efficient
integrated industry in each of the five States. This would ensure
that the proposals are economically feasible and realistic, and each
State would be assured that it was getting its "fair share" of the
new industries.
In summary, the regional institutions have not been able to put
the scheme of integrated industries into full operation even though
the need for industrialization is imperative. The designation pro-
cedure is currently too cumbersome and lengthy to encourage in-
dustries to apply for integrated status. The rivalry for integrated
industries and industrial investment by the five States has caused
the process to bog down.
New commitments by the highest levels of the individual govern-
ments are needed. To obtain these commitments, the regional in-
stitutions must devise a plan of industrialization and investment for
each of the five States and offer it to them as a package. The
substantial benefits should then make the scheme attractive to in-
vestors.
B. Forms of Investment
Assuming that outside investment can be attracted by the bene-
89 Protocol II, id. at 109.
90 The following applications were made: (1) Guatemala - pulp and paper mill;
(2) Honduras - pulp and paper mill; (3) Nicaragua - pulp and paper mill; (4)
Guatemala - nylon filaments plant; (5) El Salvador - nylon filaments plant; (6)
Costa Rica - steel industry; (7) Honduras - steel industry.
91 D. RAMSETI, supra note 80, at 64.
921d. at 55.
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fits offered in the Agreement on Integrated Industries, the form of
that investment is critical. Foreign investment is extremely costly.13
From the capital importing State's view, the reason for the use of
foreign investment is one of necessity due to its inability to raise
capital within the State. Also, foreign investment tends to dampen
the development of national enterprises. Foreign investors exercise
monopoly control and usually do not sell their shares locally. Since
many of the companies that invest abroad have a larger dollar value
in output than the host State has in gross national product, they can
exercise a great deal of pressure on the national government, both
internally and externally.
Foreign investors provide three commodities - capital, technol-
ogy, and management skills - the amounts of which vary with the
form of investment. The more of each commodity the foreign
investor supplies, the more costly are the concessions that the host
government must make. The object is for the foreign investor and
the host government to choose a form of organization that meets
the needs of both.
Wholly or majority owned foreign subsidiaries are not favored
by the host government since the State, has relatively little control
over the enterprise. While a State may accept this form of organ-
ization when capital, technology, and management skills are scarce,
it will not when the only need is capital. The establishment of the
foreign subsidiary and its operation lessens the scarcity of technol-
ogy and trains managers, making the amount of outside participa-
tion dependent only upon the scarcity of capital. Consequently,
this form of organization is. self-defeating for the foreign investor
in the long run. One possible solution is for the company to keep
majority control, but as technology and management skills become
more developed in the region, to allow and encourage a greater
portion of national participation. 94  From the State's point of view,
it could require an agreement calling for diminishing foreign own-
ership over a period of years.
Host States favor joint ventures rather than investment by means
of a subsidiary.", While most foreign investors are willing to accept
a joint venture where they have majority control, they will not ac-
93 INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 84, at 27, 68; Grunwald,
Foreign Private Investment: The Challenge of Latin American Nationalism, 11 VA.
J. INT'L L 228 (1971).
94 INTER-AMERIcAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 84, at 76.
9r Id. at 75. See generally Gordon, Joint Business Adventures in the Central Amer-
ican Common Market, 21 VAND. L. REV. 315 (1968).
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cept the converse. 96 One solution to this problem is to bring in-
ternational institutions or development banks into the equity picture,
giving each of them a substantial interest. Of course, foreign par-
ticipation cannot be reduced too much or foreign investors will lose
interest in maintaining the profitability and efficiency of the enter-
prise. The problem for the host State is that "local" sources of
capital formation must still provide substantial capital and, in many
cases, this may be very difficult or impossible to accomplish.
Another form of investment is the management contract where
foreigners only provide managerial skills. The problem with a
management contract is that the host State receives very little bene-
fit of foreign capital and also very little inflow of technology oc-
curs. Dependence on foreign investment is nil, but this itself
may raise the problem of national capital formation. If a State is
lacking in technical know-how rather than management skills, then
a technical assistance agreement relieves the State from the disad-
vantages of having foreign capital and management while providing
the needed technology. This type of arrangement may be desirable
to the host State if it can provide the capital and management.
Still another form of investment that is used is the coproduc-
tion agreement where the national company acquires technology
from a foreign source and pays for it by exporting its products to
the source. This type of agreement gives the national company an
assured market. The inflow of capital is low but national control
and ownership is maximized.
The international corporation is a form of private foreign invest-
ment, that deserves special consideration. 7 An international or
multinational corporation considers the markets of two or more
States within its permanent field of action, and it produces or lends
services on the basis of that multinational market. Because its
growth and well-being depend on more than one State, its deci-
sionmakers must take into account multinational alternatives. 8
There are three dangers that exist with an international corpo-
ration. The first is the danger of an oligopoly. The international
9
6 INTER-AmERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 84, at 77.
97 Goldberg & Kindleberger, Toward a GATT For Investment: A Proposal for
Supervision of the International Corporation, 2 LAW & POLICY INT'L Bus. 295 (1970);
Grundwald, supra note 93; Oliver, Speculation on Developing Country Reception of
Multinational Enterprise, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 192 (1971); Rubin, Multinational Enter-
prise and National Sovereignty: A Skeptic's Analysis, 3 LAW & POLICY INTL Bus. 1
(1971). See generally Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Trans-
national Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739 (1970).
9 8 INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 84, at 201.
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corporation normally applies a global strategy to its individual sub-
sidiaries so that it can take advantage of profit opportunities created
by its monopoly in technology, its access to additional capital,
and its capacity to operate in a way not controlled by market forces.
"The existence of oligopoly in an industry implies, among other
things, a redistribution of income from consumers to oligopolists.
When the owners are (nationals) the redistribution takes place
within the (country) .'" Secondly, international corporations do
not always maximize the profits of their subsidiaries. "[T]he rele-
vant yield for an international corporation is not the subsidiary's
profit: it is the yield to the total network of the investor's inter-
est . 1.0.""0 Finally, the center of decisionmaking is located abroad.
This causes national control to be minimized, especially where the
total volume of sales of the international corporation exceeds the
gross national product of the host government.
The structure of the multinational corporation creates an impor-
tant asymmetry in the legal relationship betwen countries. The
government of the parent corporation will normally hold it respon-
sible for the action of its subsidiary; but the government in the re-
ceiving country will not normally declare jurisdiction over activi-
ties of the parent .... The divisions of the multinational corporate
family are not equal partners; this is one important reason the term
"multinational" is inappropriate; the span of the firm may be multi-
national but the corporations themselves are national. 101
Considering the defects of the preceding forms of investment,
a more appropriate form for industrial development would be Cen-
tral American multinational corporations. They could be public
companies with private participation, 0 2 or private companies on the
same plane as ADELA."1  These corprations should be regional.
To accomplish this, the CACM regional institutions should be given
the authority to charter and regulate the corporations. Central
99 REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY,
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY 40 (1968).
100 R. VERNON, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE LDC's: AN EXPLORA-
TION OF ALTERNATIVE FORMS 5-6 (mimeograph, 1968).
101 S. HYMER, NATIONAL POLICIES TOWARDS MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
35 (mimeograph, 1968).
102 INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 4, at 85.
103 ADELA Investment Company S.A. is a private multinational investment com-
pany. Its shareholders include more than 160 industrial companies, banks, and finan-
cial institutions. To encourage active interest in ADELA the minimum holding is
$100,000 and to assure broad holdings the maximum holding is $500,000 (authorized
capital is $50 million). The company derives its profits from interest dividends and
capital appreciation on its investments in Latin American private enterprises. ADELA,
General Information, Apr., 1968 (pamphlet).
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American multinational corporations would change the inability of
the individual States to control the parent of an international corpo-
ration, and the center of decisionmaking would be located within
the region. Even if the corporation did not maximize profits in
any one State, it would maximize profits for the region as a whole.
Multinational corporations could become the focal point for
Central American entrepreneurship. "Their size and status would
enable them to organize consortia of national and foreign investors,
to be adequate instruments for implementing inter-industry and
complementation agreements and to carry out large projects beyond
the capacity of presently existing single institutions, maintaining
throughout a '(Central) American presence' in decision making."'10 4
While the Central American multinational corporation would not
instantly replace the international corporation or other forms of
investment, its eventual growth would provide an alternative to the
present form of private foreign investment.
V. CONCLUSION
While intraregional trade has consistently increased in recent
years, the scheme of integrated industries and industrial develop-
ment has lagged in the Central American Common Market. The
CACM has been unable to relieve the unequal levels of industrial
development by means of the Agreement on the System of Inte-
grated Industries.' 0 ' It is suggested that the Agreement be revital-
ized by a new, more rapid designation process as well as new com-
mitments by the five States. When this is combined with a con-
certed effort of regional planning, in the form of economically
feasible projects for all five States, the possibility for industrializa-
tion increases. Finally, the form of the industrialization should be
through Central American multinational corporations. This would
tend to give the region more control over its development and al-
leviate the problems that arise from private foreign investment.
JEFFREY P. RUDOLPH
104 INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 84, at 86.
105 See note 5 supra.
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TABLE 1*
INTRAREGIONAL TRADE'
1966 1967 1968 1969 19702
Costa Rica 25.8 31.0 37.7 36.1 46.2
El Salvador 58.6 79.2 84.9 74.8 73.5
Guatemala 55.1 65.7 77.5 86.4 102.4
Honduras 21.5 23.5 31.3 23.9 18.1
Nicaragua 14.9 18.6 26.9 30.9 46.1
Total 175.9 218.0 258.3 252.1 286.3
1 Exports F.O.B., in millions of U.S. dollars.
2 Preliminary figures - does not include Salvadorian exports to Honduras or Hon-
duran exports to El Salvador.
Source: SIECA, Information Letters, May & June 1971.
TABLE 2*
TOTAL TRADE
Exports' 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Costa Rica 136 144 171 190 229
El Salvador 189 207 213 202 229
Guatemala 232 204 227 262 298
Honduras 143 154 179 167
Nicaragua 138 146 157 155
Total 838 855 947 976
Imports2
Costa Rica 178 191 214 245 317
El Salvador 220 224 214 209 214
Guatemala 207 247 249 250 284
Honduras 149 165 185 184 183
Nicaragua 182 202 185 177 170
Total 936 1029 1047 1065 1168
Regional Trade
Deficit 98 174
I F.O.B., Millions of U.S. dollars.
2 C.I.F., Millions of U.S. dollars.
* Source: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
(Aug. 1971).
24 INT'L FINANCIAL STATISTICS 36
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